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Abstract
The share of income collected in taxes is much higher in developed
economies than in developing economies, yet among developing economies,
the influence of per capita income on the tax share is much less
clear. Most studies to date have discovered no statistical relation-
ship between the tax share and per capita income when other measures
of economic development are included in the model. The present study
finds a statistically significant negative relationship between the
tax share and per capita real GDP for a sample of eight African
countries over a nine year period of their development. This study
also finds that the tax share is negatively related to the agriculture
share but positively related to the trade and mining shares. The
model is used to compute tax effort indices for the eight countries.
A statistical test is performed to identify those countries with tax
effort indices greater than one and those with tax effort indices less
than one.

TAX SHARES IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES: A PANEL STUDY
Typically, tax shares in developing economies are studied using
cross-country data on a sample of low income countries. The goal is
to measure a country's tax effort by comparing its predicted tax share
with its actual tax share where its predicted tax share is determined
from a regression relating tax shares to various explanatory (control)
variables such as per capita income, the ratio of imports and exports
to GDP, and the share of agriculture and mining in GDP. If the ratio
of the actual share to the predicted share is less than one, the
country is identified as a low tax effort country. Conversely if the
ratio is greater than one.
This approach has been subjected to many criticisms. Richard Bird
(1976) bemoans the lack of theoretical justification underlying the
models purported to explain taxable capacity. How, for example, are
differences in demand for public services accounted for? Bird also
points to the poor quality of data and to the inadequacy of cross-
country data for drawing inferences about changes that occur over
time. He further cautions against using as a standard an average that
o
is based on "some abstract hybrid of all countries". It is important
to take into account the economic, political, and administrative con-
ditions of the country (or homogeneous collection of countries) being
studied.
Despite these criticisms, tax effort indices are widely used for
policy purposes. They may, for example, be used for judging the
potential of taxation for funding public spending increases. High
-2-
indices indicate that taxation as a funding source is already highly
burdened and other funding sources should be tapped or spending in-
creases postponed. Tax effort indices are also used by international
agencies as a basis for international grants. It is sometimes argued
that distribution of grants on a straight per capita basis would allow
countries to substitute external funds for locally raised funds.
Targeting funds to high tax effort countries provides some assurance
that local revenue sources have already been tapped.
Since tax effort indices are important guides to policy in devel-
oping economies, it is crucial that they be estimated using appropriate
techniques. This study attempts to account for some of the criticisms
raised of earlier studies by first of all offering a stronger theore-
tical basis for the tax share model. An optimal tax share is derived
assuming welfare maximizing behavior on the part of public decision
makers subject to the availability of tax bases. Secondly, rather
than using cross-country data, this study uses a panel of cross-
country and time series data for a relatively homogeneous group of
eight African countries (Ivory Coast, Senegal, Mali, Cameroon, Kenya,
Nigeria, Ghana, and Tanzania). The first four of these countries are
Francophone and the remaining four Anglophone. The time period of
study is 1973 through 1931.
In Section I, a theoretical model of tax behavior is developed,
and the data and econometric methods used to analyze the data are
described. In Section II, the results are presented, and in Section
III, their policy and behavioral implications are discussed.
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I. The Model and Data
In order to model tax behavior of a developing country, I assume
that fiscal choices reflect the actions of a public decision maker or
council of public decision makers. I further assume that they maxi-
mize a welfare function that has as its arguments private disposable
income and public goods and services. Welfare is maximized subject to
a budget constraint that accounts for the alternative modes of domes-
tic financing.
The welfare function of the decision maker is
(1) U = U(Y - T, G
c
,
G
]
.)
where Y - T is disposable income in the private sector (equal to gross
domestic product, Y, less tax revenue, T), G is government consump-
tion, and G is government investment expenditure for development pur-
poses. All variables are in real per capita terms.
In maximizing the welfare function, the decision maker is con-
strained to balance the budget. The sum of revenue inflows must equal
the sum of public expenditures:
(2) T+F+B=G
C
+G
I
where F is the sum of foreign grants and loans and B is domestic
borrowing.
The decision maker is also constrained by institutional con-
straints that limit tax choices such as the availability of convenient
tax handles (tax bases that lend themselves to taxation). In devel-
oping countries, the administrative difficulty of collection as well
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as political resistance to taxation pose serious obstacles to achiev-
ing a desired level of tax effort. It is assumed that the actual tax
share, T/Y, is a function of the desired tax share, (T/Y)* and of the
availability of certain tax bases. Specifically,
(3) T/Y = f [(T/Y)*, A^, (X + M)/Y, Ny )
where A„ is the share of agriculture in income, X is exports, M is
imports, and N„ is the share of mining in income. It is expected that
the actual tax share is positively related to the desired tax share
and negatively related to the share of agriculture in income since
agriculture is a difficult sector to tax. This is especially so in
African countries where land is often communally owned and much agri-
culture occurs in the non-market sector. It is further expected that
the actual tax share is positively related to the share of trade in
income and the share of mining in income. These sectors provide con-
venient handles for taxation since the goods must pass through ports
of entry and exit, they are highly monetized, and they are dominated
by a few large organizations.
The desired tax share is determined by maximizing the welfare
function subject to the balanced budget constraint. It is assumed
that the welfare function takes the form:
(4) U = a ln(Y-T-Y
s
) + (i-a ) ln(G-Gg)
where a is a constant between zero and one, G is the sum of government
consumption and government investment, Y„ is subsistence income, and
G is subsistence public goods and services. Maximizing U with respect
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to T and G subject to constraint (2) yields the following equation for
the desired tax share:
(5) (T/Y)* = (1-a) - a[(F+B)/Y] + [(aG
s
-(l-a)Yg)/Y
]
which says that the desired tax share is positively related to the
welfare weight on government goods and services, (1-a), and negatively
related to the ratio of foreign gifts, grants and domestic borrowing
to income. The relationship between the desired tax share and the
level of income is ambiguous depending for its sign on the sign of
(aG_ - (l-a)Yg) which in turn depends on subsistence levels of govern-
ment goods and services, on income, and on the welfare weight. It is
impossible to predict a priori whether this difference will be posi-
tive or negative.
Substituting equation (5) into equation (3) and assuming (3) to be
a linear function yields the basic model of this study:
(6) (T/Y) = b Q + b 1 [(F+B)/Y] + b 2 (l/Y) + b 3Ay +
b
4
[(X+M)/Y] + b
5
Ny + e
where b, and b^ are expected to be negative, b, and be are expected to
be positive, and b~ is of indeterminate sign. The properties of the
error terra, e, are described later.
The sample data are represented by eight cross-country units over
nine periods of time. Hence, there are 72 = 8 x 9 observations. The
data are from the African Statistical Yearbook published by the United
Nations and from the International Financial Statistics published by
the International Monetary Fund.
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The model is first estimated using ordinary least squares regres-
sion on the pooled data. Next, it is recognized that omitted
variables may lead to changing cross-section and time-series inter-
cepts. A covariance model is estimated which allows for changing
intercepts by the addition of dummy variables. Finally, the
possibility is introduced that the model is first-order autoregressive
with contemporaneous correlation between cross sections.
Specifically, the autoregressive model assumes the errors are random:
(7) e.. 1=1,... ,8; j=l,...,9
and have the structure:
2
E(e. ) = s, , (heteroscdasticity)
ij 11
E(e, e, ) = s
,
(contemporaneously correlated)
ij kj lk
e = r e + u (autoregression)
ij i ij-1 ij
Heteroskedasticity may arise if there is a higher variance in the
estimated residuals for the larger countries in terms of population or
income. Contemporaneous correlation arises since the countries are
all from the same geographic region, and autoregression arises if the
error this period in country i depends on the error last period in
country i. The model is estimated using generalized least squares on
3
the transformed data.
In the estimation, all data have been deflated to constant 1980
prices using each country's own GDP deflator. The variables have also
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been converted to dollars using the current year exchange rate and put
on a per capita basis.
II. Econometric Results
The estimation of equation (6) yields estimates of the coefficients
and their properties. Table 1 shows the regression, covariance, and
autoregressive results.
A. Description of the results
As seen in Table 1, the regression model which assumes a constant
structure over time and across countries performed poorly. Only one
coefficient was of expected sign and significantly different from
zero, the coefficient of trade share, (X + M)/Y. The coefficient of
the share of grants and borrowing in GDP, (F + B)/Y, is positive and
significantly different from zero, an unexpected result. The other
coefficients are of expected sign but not significantly different from
2 2
zero. Further, the R and adjusted R are relatively low and the
Durbin Watson statistic, DW, indicates rejection of the null hypothe-
sis of no autoregression at the 1% confidence level.
The covariance model (column 2 of Table 1) fits the data much
better than does the regression model. As mentioned above, the
covariance model allows the intercept term to vary over time and over
country. This was accomplished by introducing eight time dummy
variables and seven country dummy variables. The coefficients of the
dummy variables are not shown in the table because they are of little
interest in themselves. Of primary interest are the coefficient
estimates for the explanatory variables. Note that these are all of
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Table 1
Model Estimation Results Using Pooled Data, 1973-81
Variable
Constant
(F+B)/Y
1/Y
*Y
(X+M)/Y
N
Y
SSE
R
2
?2
DW
Regression Covariance Auto regressive
Model Model Model
.103** .164** .169**
.252** -.016 -.125**
-.569 11.998 14.602**
-.090 -.208* -.142**
.113** .114* .057*
.005 .170 .125
.053 .026 .023
.421 .713
.377 .601
.923 1.041
-'Significant at 5% level.
**Signif icant at 1% level.
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expected sign, though not always significantly different from zero.
2 2
The R and adjusted R are significantly higher than in the regression
model, however the Durbin Watson statistic continues to indicate
rejection of the no autoregression hypothesis.
One drawback of the covariance model relative to the regression
model is that the covariance model sacrifices degrees of freedom. By
comparing the residual sum of squares for the two models, one can test
whether the ordinary least squares assumptions are proper. The appro-
priate test statistic is:
(ESS
1
-ESS
2
)/(N+T-2)
(8) (ESS )/(NT-N-T) FN+T-2,NT-N-T
where ESS and ESS are the residual sum of squares using the regres-
sion and covariance model, respectively. In our case, the F statistic
is 3.808 which exceeds the critical F at the 1% confidence level lead-
ing to rejection of the regression model in favor of the covariance
model.
Even though it is less restrictive than the regression model, the
covariance model itself is still highly restrictive. It assumes that
the regression disturbances are independent across countries as well
as homoskedastic and not autoregressive. Since all the countries in
this study are from the same region, raise similar crops, engage each
other in trade, and, in some cases, use a common currency, these
assumptions are most likely not appropriate. The autoregressive
model, whose results are shown in column 3 of Table 1, addresses this
concern.
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In the case of the autoregressive model, all the coefficients are
of expected sign and all, save one, are statistically different from
zero at the 5% level or better. The only insignificant coefficient is
that of the mining share, N but it is of expected sign. The insig-
nificance of this coefficient is not surprising, however, since raining
is an unimportant industry in these countries. The autoregressive
model also fits the data better than the other two models as seen by
its SSE of .023 as compared to SSE's of .053 and .026 for the regres-
sion and covariance models, respectively.
Of the three estimation methods, regression, covariance, and
autoregression, the latter not only fits the data better but also
better confirms our theoretical expectations. Next, the estimation
results are applied to the computation of tax effort indices for the
eight countries studied.
B. Computation of the tax effort index
The tax effort index is computed by taking the ratio of the actual
tax share to the predicted tax share. As mentioned earlier, if this
ratio is greater than one, the country is said to be a high effort
country. Conversely if the ratio is less than one.
The denominator of the tax effort index is the predicted tax
share. Since one purpose of computing the tax effort index is to make
cross-country comparisons, two of the models developed earlier, the
covariance and autoregressive models, are inappropriate for predicting
tax share since they control for cross-country differences through the
use of country dummy variables. Hence, these models are reestimated
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without the country dummies, and the reestimated models are used to
predict tax share. The ratio of predicted to actual tax share is then
computed for each country for each year.
In order to see how these indices compare across countries, a
regression is run relating the tax effort index to the country dummy
variables. The model has the form:
(9) Actual tax share/predicted tax share = c
n
+ E c D.
i=l 1
where:
D. = 1 for country i and
D. = otherwise.
l
Since inclusion of dummy variables for all eight countries could cause
perfect multicollinearity , a dummy variable for one country was
omitted to be captured in the constant term. The results from esti-
mating this model for each of the three tax share models (regression,
covariance, and autoregressive) appear in Table 2. The constant term
can be interpreted as the tax effort of the omitted country, Tanzania.
The slope coefficients for each country reflect the differential tax
effort between that country and Tanzania.
Note that the regression based on the autoregressive model fits
2
the data best using the adjusted R criterion. For that regression,
all slope coefficients are negative and significantly different from
zero. Note also that the autoregressive model accentuates the inter-
country differences in tax effort.
-12-
Table 2
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation of
Tax Effort by Country, 197 3-81
Regression Covariance Autoregressive
Variable Model Model Model
Constant 1.151** 1.164** 1.341**
Cameroon -.223** -.194** -.530**
Mali -.275** -.293** -.499**
Kenya -.057 -.076 -.201**
Ivory Coast -.231** -.251** -.381**
Ghana -.207** -.224** -.353**
Senegal -.034 -.078 -.317**
Nigeria -.139* -.202** -.327**
R
2
.275 .277 .539
R
2
.196 .198 .489
'•Significant at 5% level.
**Significant at 1% level.
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Tax effort indices are calculated for each country based on the
three models of Table 2. These results are shown in Table 3. A.
t-test was performed to see which of these indices are significantly
different from one. For the regression model, only Tanzania's tax
effort was significantly greater than one at the .05 level. For the
covariance model, tax effort in Mali tests significantly less than
one, and in the autoregressive model, tax effort in the Cameroon tests
significantly less than one as well. In both the covariance and
autoregressive models, tax effort in Kenya is significantly greater
than one. For the other countries, there is no evidence that their
tax effort is significantly different from one.
C. Comparison of results with those of other studies
Among the first modern cross-country studies of tax ratios were by
Lotz and Morss (1969, 1970). They developed a model which has become
a standard for future studies:
(10) (T/Y) = cQ + cj Y + c 2 [(X+M)/Y] + e
which they estimated on a sample of 72 countries and separately for
high and low income countries. They found a significant positive
relationship between the tax share and both per capita income and the
degree of openness (measured by the sum of exports and imports divided
by GNP) for the entire sample and for the low income subsample but not
for the high income sample. However, their model failed to explain a
high proportion of the variance in the tax ratio for either of the
2
subsamples (adjusted R of .000 for the high income countries and .200
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Table 3
Tax Effort Index by Country
Country
Tanzania
Cameroon
Mali
Kenya
Ivory Coast
Ghana
Senegal
Nigeria .962 .962 1.014
Significantly greater than 1 at 5% level.
Significantly less than 1 at 5% level.
Regression Covariance Aut<aregressive
Model Model Model
1.15l a l.l64a 1.34l a
.927 .970 .811 b
.876b .871 b .842b
1.094 1.088a l.l40a
.919 .913 .960
.944 .940 .933
1.117 3 1.086 1.024
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for the low income countries). In later work, they were able to
increase the proportion of the variance explained by the model to .453
for low income countries by adding monetization, decentralization, and
export concentration variables to the model but with the result that
per capita income was no longer significant.
Shin (1969) attempted to extend the Lotz-Morss study by adding
independent variables to the model: the ratio of agriculture to total
income, the rate of growth of population, and the rate of growth of
prices. For low income countries, he found only the rate of price
increase and the rate of population growth to be significant. Shin
offered little a priori justification for these variables.
Bahl (1971) tried still a different model for explaining tax
shares in developing economies. In his model, the agriculture share
of income replaced per capita income as a proxy for the stage of
development, the raining share of income was introduced to reflect the
sectoral composition of income produced, and openness was measured by
the export share of income. The latter was found to be insignificant
and subsequently dropped frora the model. He found taxable capacity to
respond negatively to higher agriculture shares and positively to
higher mining shares. More recent IMF studies by Chelliah, Baas, and
Kelly (1975), Tait, Gratz, and Eichengreen (1979), and Tanzi (1987)
estimated the Lotz-Morss and Bahl models using newer cross-country
data. Per capita income continues to be a nonsignificant explanatory
variable while the agriculture share and raining share have significant
coefficients of expected sign but not when they are used in conjunc-
tion with per capita income.
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The estimation equation in the present study differs somewhat from
those of earlier studies. Per capita income enters the model in
inverse form so that its coefficient, if positive, indicates a nega-
tive relationship between the tax share and per capita income. The
autoregressive model estimates this coefficient to be positive and
significant though the other two models do not find a significant
coefficient. A negative relationship between the tax share and per
capita income is consistent with the theoretical model proposed in
this study but inconsistent with the results of earlier studies which
generally show no relationship between tax share and per capita
income.
Another difference between the present study and earlier studies
is the inclusion in the present study of the share of foreign grants,
loans, and domestic borrowing in income. The theoretical model
hypothesized a negative relationship between this variable and the tax
share. This was confirmed by the autoregressive model of the present
study.
Finally, the present study extends the literature by using panel
data rather than cross-country data to estimate the tax share equa-
tion. An advantage of panel data is that it adds degrees of freedom,
allowing the estimation of the tax share equation on a fairly small
and homogeneous group of countries. However, a panel of data poses
estimation problems not encountered in a simple cross-country study.
In particular, assumptions must be made about the error structure that
are not of concern in a cross-country study. The autoregressive model
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used in this study performed in a very satisfactory way, confirming
the expectations of the theoretical model and fitting the data well.
III. Conclusions
The results obtained from the estimation shed light on the sta-
tistical relationship between tax share and a set of explanatory vari-
ables including per capita income, nontax income share, agriculture
share, openness, and mining share in a set of African countries. The
signs of the estimated coefficients are consistent with the expec-
tations of a simple theoretical model of the public sector decision
process. The major conclusions of the study are:
(1) There is a negative and significant relationship between
per capita income and the tax share when other measures of
economic development are included in the model. Since per capita
income enters the model in inverse form, its positive and
significant coefficient suggests that an increase in per capita
income will result in a decrease in the tax share after
controlling for other variables. This result, though consistent
with the expectations of the theoretical model, is consistent with
the results of earlier studies which estimate the relationship to
be either insignificant or positive.
(2) Increases in foreign grants and loans and in domestic
borrowing lead to decreases in the tax share. This negative
relationship is picking up a displacement effect that is con-
sistent with the expectations of the theoretical model.
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(3) A large trade sector is associated with a high tax share
while a large agriculture sector is associated with a low tax
share. This is consistent with the results of earlier studies
which include these variables to reflect the availability of tax
handles. This study found no significant relationship between
the tax share and the mining share, perhaps because mining is not
an important industry in the countries studied.
This study goes on to apply these results to the calculation of
tax effort indices for the eight African countries in the sample. It
is found that two countries have tax effort indices statistically
greater than one, two have tax effort indices statistically less than
one, and the remaining four countries have tax effort indices sta-
tistically equal to one. Care must be taken in the interpretation
placed on the tax effort index. It is dangerous to use such an index
to separate the "bad guys" from the "good guys" because it is unclear
whether or not all relevant influences on tax effort have been
included. The index may be useful, however, as a descriptive sta-
tistic which can serve as a helpful policy guide. One might conclude,
for example, that a country with a high tax effort index has little
potential for financing additional government spending through taxa-
tion as opposed to countries with lov; tax effort indices. Whether one
agrees with their use or not, tax effort indices are used by national
and international agencies to justify foreign aid. Hence, as an
objective measure of tax performance, they deserve careful measure-
ment.
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Future study should be directed toward expansion of the data base
to include more countries and a longer time horizon. Data incon-
sistencies in the pre-1973 data prevented the present study from using
a longer horizon. Another extension would be to use an alternative
form of the welfare function as the base for the theoretical model.
The Cobb-Douglas form was chosen for the present study because it
leads conveniently to a linear estimation function. Expansion of the
model to include additional explanatory variables or to disaggregate
the present variables could add richness to the model. As better and
more consistent data become available for developing economies,
expanded models can be employed. Finally, it has been argued that for
some purposes tax effort should be measured in terms of discretionary
changes in tax receipts rather than automatic changes. To do this
requires more data than were available for this study.
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FOOTNOTES
As examples, see Chelliah, Baas, and Kelly (1975) and Tait,
Gratz , and Eichengreen (1976).
2
Bird (1976), p. 258.
3
The data are transformed in a first stage in which the autore-
gressive characteristic of the data is removed (asymptotically) using
a consistent estimate of the first-order autoregressive parameter.
This model is described in detail in Kmenta (1986), pp. 622-625.
4
One time and one country dummy variable were omitted since their
addition would result in perfect collinearity among the explanatory
variables.
5
See Bird (1976), pp. 260-261 and Newlyn (1985).
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